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INTRODUCTION: OF APPLES AND ORANGES

The litigation explosion in construction law over the last
thirty years has dramatically increased the liability of contractors and design professionals. In recent years, several courts
have accepted arguments against the long-established economic
loss doctrine. The economic loss doctrine limits the recovery of
damages in tort for product defects when the defect has caused
neither a personal injury nor any damages to property other
than the manufacturer's work itself. This article will review and
analyze the cases in which litigants have attempted to impose
liability in tort upon construction contractors for economic loss1
resulting from construction defects. Further, the article will
trace the historical development of recovery for economic loss
through the tort theories of negligence 2 and strict liability.

1. "Economic loss" is defined generally as "damages for inadequate value, costs of
repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of profits - without
any claim of personal injury or damage to other property." See Note, Economic Loss in
Products Liability Jurisprudence,66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 918 (1966). The term also encompasses "the diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in quality
and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold." See
Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasersfor "Economic Loss" Damages - Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 541 (1966).
2. The economic loss doctrine has no application to intentional torts, such as the
tort of intentional interference with contractual or business relations. In such cases, the
very object of the wrongful conduct is to harm the plaintiff's economic interests, and
recovery is allowed. Waldinger Corp. v. Ashbrook-Simon-Hartley, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 970
(C.D. Il1, 1983), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds sub nom. Waldinger Corp. v.
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The use of tort theories to recover economic loss has received a mixed reception among the state courts. Within the
construction industry, the issue often arises in the context of

contractors' claims against design professionals, seeking recovery
of damages resulting from delays or recovery of extra costs resulting from negligently prepared plans and specifications.4
By and large, courts that have allowed recovery of economic
loss do not speak the same language as the courts that have held
fast to the economic loss rule. The analysis employed by courts
rejecting the economic loss rule tends to focus on the foreseeability of economic harm as the determinant of liability; those
courts applying the economic loss rule to limit recovery often
recognize the theoretical problems inherent in expanding the
scope of tort duty to include economic interests not traditionally
protected by tort law. Opinions from one camp often fail entirely to address the policy concerns of the other. The result is
that the two sides of the issue appear as different as apples and
oranges.
Defenses available to remote parties, such as privity, 5 have

CRS Group Engineers, Inc., 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985); Santucci Constr. Co. v. Baxter
& Woodman, Inc., 151 Ill. App. 3d 547, 502 N.E.2d 1134 (1986); Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B.
216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
3. Compare Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)
(carpet manufacturer strictly liable to downstream consumer for economic loss) with
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (truck
manufacturer strictly liable for personal injuries; economic injuries recoverable under
Uniform Commercial Code warranty provisions). See also infra text accompanying notes
95-109.
4. See, e.g., Bates & Rogers Constr. Corp. v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 128 Ill.
App. 3d 962, 471 N.E.2d 915 (1984); Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C. Morris Assocs.,
175 N.J. Super. 341, 418 A.2d 1290 (Ct. Law Div. 1980), aff'd, 199 N.J. Super. 498, 489
A.2d 1233 (Ct. App. Div. 1985); see also Annotation, Tort Liability of Project Architect
for Economic Damages Suffered by Contractor, 65 A.L.R.3D 249 (1975)(collecting cases).
A thorough analysis of the liability of the design professional for economic losses
sustained by a remote contractor is beyond the scope of this article, although some of
those policy concerns do overlap with the question of economic loss in construction defect litigation. A major distinction between the two lines of cases is the courts' reliance
on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT], which provides a cause of action in tort against one who "supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions," in actions against design professionals. Id.
See, e.g., Malta Constr. Co. v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 902
(N.D. Ga. 1988); Pritchard Bros. v. Grady Co., 428 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 1988).
5. In Carolina Winds Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 80,
374 S.E.2d 897, 901 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd on rehearing,No. 25 Davis Adv. Sh. 21 (S.C.
Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1988), the court defined privity in the context of a construction law
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retarded judicial development of the economic loss rule in the
construction context. As long as courts clung to the requirement
of privity, caveat emptor,6 or the "completed and accepted" defense,7 they did not need to analyze the theoretical problems
posed by the recovery of economic loss in tort.,As the above defenses have crumbled, some courts have been slow to recognize
those problems associated with eliminating the economic loss
rule. Indeed, it is not unusual to find appellate courts affirming
the award of economic damages without mentioning the issue.'
This article will conclude that the economic loss rule should
be retained. Courts that reject the economic loss rule generally
fail to recognize that tort law historically has refused to impose
a duty to prevent economic loss in construction defect cases. It
follows, therefore, that because tort law historically has not recognized such a duty, the decision to do so should be made - if
at all - as a conscious policy decision based on consideration of
the interests of all parties affected and a weighing of the consequences. A weighing of the interests for and against the economic loss rule militates against rejecting it.
II.

A.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC Loss
DOCTRINE

Description and Operation of the Economic Loss Doctrine

The economic loss doctrine marks the fundamental boundary between contract law, which is designed to enforce the expectancy interests of the parties, and tort law, which imposes a
duty of reasonable care and thereby encourages citizens to avoid
claim: "'The general rule is that a contractor, manufacturer, vendor or furnisher of an
article is not liable to third parties who have no contractual relations with him for negligence in the construction, manufacture or sale of such article.'" (quoting 2 T. COOLEY,
COOLEY ON TORTS 1486 (J. Lewis 3d ed. 1906)). See also 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 778, at 29 (1951).
6. The South Carolina Court of Appeals stated that "where there was no express
warranty and no fraud by the seller, [courts] applied the doctrine expressed in the
maxim caveat emptor ('let the buyer beware')." See C. Ray Miles Constr. Co. v. Weaver,
296 S.C. 466, 468, 373 S.E.2d 905, 906 (1988).
7. The "completed and accepted" defense asserts that the builder's liability is terminated upon the completion of his work and acceptance thereof by the owner. See
Young v. Smith & Kelly Co., 124 Ga. 475, 52 S.E. 765 (1905).
8. See, e.g., Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss4/5

4

Barrett: Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for Construction Defects: A Cri

1989]

RECOVERY FOR CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS

895

causing physical harm to others.9 Simply stated, the economic
loss doctrine holds that one may not recover "economic" losses
under a tort theory.
An "economic loss" is the loss of an expectancy interest created by contract, often described as the "benefit of the bargain."
An economic loss occurs when a product is inferior in quality or
does not work for the purpose for which it was intended. Economic losses generally are said to include the diminution in
value of an item due to its defective nature, the cost of repairing
the defect, the cost of replacement, and the consequent loss of
use or lost profits. 10
Courts often have stated that economic losses are not recoverable in tort absent privity of contract. This is somewhat misleading because the economic loss doctrine bars recovery in tort
even between parties that are in privity.1" The crux of the doctrine is not privity but the premise that economic interests are
protected, if at all, by contract principles, rather than tort principles. At least one court has held that the economic loss doctrine bars recovery in tort regardless of whether a contract remedy is available to the injured party.' 2
When the defective product damages protected interests, either by causing physical harm to an individual or by damaging
property other than the product itself, the resultant loss is not
considered "economic" and recovery for the damage is permitted
in tort."3 Most courts have had little difficulty in distinguishing

9. See Sacramento Regional Transit Dist. v. Grumman Flxible, 158 Cal. App. 3d
289, 294, 204 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739 (1984).
10. See supra note 1.
11. See cases cited infra at notes 21, 22, and 23; see also Woodward v. Chirco Constr. Co., 141 Ariz. 514, 687 P.2d 1269 (1984) (collapsed fireplace entitled owner to sue his
builder in contract for the cost of repairing the fireplace and in tort for the consequential
damage to property other than the fireplace caused by the collapse).
12. See Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 146, 503
N.E.2d 246 (1986). But see Latite Roofing Co. v. Urbanek, 528 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988).
13. Thus, where a contractor's defective work has resulted in contamination or injury to parts of a construction project built by others, recovery is permitted. See City of
Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 640 F. Supp. 559, 664 (D.S.C. 1986) (asbestos contamination); Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 464 (Alaska 1983) (toxic fumes from supplier's defective insulation caused "physical alteration" and "physical damage" to home).
Not every interest that might be recognized in other legal contexts as a "property
interest" will suffice as "property" for purpose of showing "damage to other property"
under the economic loss doctrine. See Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 233 Va. 31, 34 n.3, 353
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the above types of injuries from economic loss. 14 Once the plain-

tiff has shown that the defect has resulted in injury to a protected interest, some courts will permit recovery of economic
losses that otherwise would not be allowed, such as the cost of
repairing the defective product.15 To bring economic losses
within the ambit of damages resulting from infringement of a
protected interest, however, the property damage must be "legally significant" and not merely incidental to the economic
losses.'
The major debate in this area - and the issue most relevant to the litigation of construction defect cases - is whether
damage to the product itself should be considered "property
damage" or "physical injury," rather than economic loss. The economic loss doctrine states that when only the work product itself is damaged as a result of its defective nature, the damage is
defined as "economic" rather than as "property damage" and is
not recoverable in tort. In other words, if the defect and the
damage are one and the same, then the defect should not be
S.E.2d 724, 726 n.3 (1987); see also State ex rel. Smith v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 680 P.2d
1148, 1152 (Alaska 1984) (subcontractor sought to recover the cost of replacing a concrete slab from supplier who furnished defective concrete mix used in pouring the slab;
court rejected subcontractor's argument that he had a "property interest" in the slab
because the general contractor had given him a limited allowance to purchase concrete
used on the job).
14. The concept of "economic losses" has managed to confuse a few courts. In
Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 230, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1976), the court
stated that all injuries, whether to person or property, ultimately result in economic loss.
See also Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1044 n.5 (Colo. 1983) (citing Barnes for the proposition that "both injury to one's person and injury to one's property result in economic loss"); Quail Hollow E. Condominium Ass'n v. Donald J. Scholz
Co., 47 N.C. App. 518, 526, 268 S.E.2d 12, 18 (1980) (equating repairs to work product
with "property damages").
15. See Reynolds v. Bank of Am., 53 Cal. 2d 49, 50-51, 345 P.2d 926, 927-28 (1959)
(recovery for loss of airplane use when awaiting replacement); D & A Dev. Co. v. Butler,
357 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v.
Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, 354 N.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Minn. 1984)); see also People
Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 261 n.4, 495 A.2d 107, 115
n.4 (1985) (recognizing general rule that economic losses that "stand alone" and are not
"part of the entire unit or complex of damages caused by an independent threshold tort"
cannot be recovered).
16. See 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (4th Cir.
1986) ("incidental" damage to roofing under defective shingles insufficient); Chicago
Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel, Inc., 782 F.2d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 1986) (damage to
other parts of building caused by defective roof not "legally significant"); Minneapolis
Soc'y, 354 N.W.2d at 820 n.4 ("relatively minor" damage to mortar caused by failure of
defective bricks insufficient).
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considered "property damage" for purposes of tort law. 17 In the
construction setting, the problem arises when one part of a contractor's or manufacturer's product is defective and causes damage to the rest of the work product. In this situation, some
courts permit recovery in tort for all damage to the remaining
product. 8 The majority view, however, denies recovery because
any damage to the product itself is a commercial expectancy interest protected by contract law, rather than tort law. 19
B.

Origins and Development of the Economic Loss Doctrine

The modern economic loss doctrine developed in response
to three different jurisprudential concerns: (1) the theoretical
difficulties of using conduct-oriented tort standards to protect
expectancy interests created by contract; (2) the practical difficulty in fashioning a rule that permits recovery for economic loss
without subjecting the defendant to potentially limitless liability; and (3) conflict between an expanded duty in tort and the
manufacturer's rights under the Uniform Commercial Code. Although the use of tort theory to recover economic loss implicates
each of these concerns, courts have been inconsistent in addressing or even recognizing them.
1.

Historical Antecedents: Accountants and Mailcoaches

The economic loss doctrine often is described as a creature
of product defect litigation.2 ° Its historical roots, however, lie in
the nineteenth century. For as long as injured plaintiffs have

17. Sacramento Regional Transit Dist. v. Grumman FIxible, 158 Cal. App. 3d 289,
294, 204 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739 (1984).
18. See, e.g., Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1966) (engine component design caused fire that destroyed automobile); John R. Dudley
Constructors, Inc. v. Drott Mfg., 66 A.D.2d 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Ct. App. Div. 1979)
(defective component resulted in collapse of entire crane).
19. See, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 829 n.11
(8th Cir. 1983); Kiswaukee Community Health Servs. Center v. Hospital Bldg. & Equip.
Co., 638 F. Supp. 1492 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Mid-Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County
Spraying Serv. Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
20. See Carolina Winds Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc. 297 S.C. 74, 374
S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd on rehearing, No. 25 Davis Adv. Sh. 21 (S.C. Ct. App.
Nov. 30, 1988); see also 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183, 1185 (4th
Cir. 1986) ("[H]istorically, the only tort action available to the disappointed purchaser
suffering an intangible commercial loss was an action for fraud.").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2020], Art.
5
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol.

40

been denied recovery in contract for reasons such as the expiration22of statute of limitations for contract actions,21 lack of privity,

unavailability of punitive damages, 23 avoidance of contrac-

tual restrictions,24 or simply because the other contracting party
is insolvent, 25 resourceful lawyers have sought to recover in tort.
Judicial hostility to the use of tort theory to recover purely
economic losses predates the twentieth-century battle over product liability. This hostility was motivated primarily by the fear
of mass litigation and the concern that traditional tort concepts
were not capable of providing clear limitations on potentially
limitless liability.26 Defining the scope of tort duty to include

only physical harm created "built-in" limits on liability, since
any given chain of events in the physical world has finite consequences. Permitting plaintiffs to recover for purely economic
losses would result in open-ended liability, since it is virtually
impossible to predict the economic consequences of a given act.17
The early reluctance to award economic losses is well illustrated in the cases of Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co. 28 and Ultramares Corp. v.Touche, Niven & Co. 29 In Stevenson the defendant's negligence resulted in a fire that destroyed a factory.
Stevenson, a factory worker, sued to recover the wages he lost as
a result of the destruction of his work place. The Ohio Court of
Appeals observed that "damage resulting from the negligence of
one will not in all cases constitute a cause of action."3 0 The court

21. See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858

(1986).
22. See, e.g., Crowell Corp. v. Topkis Constr. Co., 280 A.2d 730 (Del. 1971);
Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978), overruled on other grounds by
Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo.
1986).
23. See, e.g., Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1986).
24. See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49, 5455 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
25. See, e.g., Juliano v. Gaston, 187 N.J. Super. 491, 455 A.2d 523 (Ct. App. Div.
1982).
26. See Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
27. See State ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Eco-

nomic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and ContractDoctrine, 49 U. CHL L. REv. 61, 71-72
(1982).
28. 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
29. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
30. 73 N.E.2d at 202 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Marietta & C. Ry. Co., 20 Ohio
St. 259, 277-78 (1870)).
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noted that although other courts had disposed of similar claims
by labeling the damages sought as "too remote" or "indirect," its
concern was to prevent the "mass of litigation" that might result
if a negligence action could be maintained for economic loss
without personal injury or property damage.31 If a worker could
sue for lost wages, the court reasoned, then so could the power
company, sellers of the factory's products, the neighborhood restaurant that relies on the trade of the factory employees, and so
on. 2 Based on the above reasoning, the court declined to permit
Stevenson to recover for his "economic" loss.
In Ultramaresthe New York Court of Appeals resolved the
question of whether an accountant who negligently prepared a
financial statement for a client was liable to third parties who
relied on its accuracy. The opinion, written by Judge Cardozo,
focused on the nature of the accountant's duty in tort. Though
his opinion noted that "the assault upon the citadel of privity is
proceeding in these days apace," 33 Judge Cardozo held that an
accountant owes no duty to third parties to refrain from negligently causing economic injury. Recognition of such a duty, he
reasoned, would expose the hapless accountant
to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt
whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that
exposes to these consequences.3 '
Thus, the critical factor in Judge Cardozo's holding, which restricted tort liability to physical damage, was the possibility of
exposing defendants to a crushing burden of liability out of pro35
portion to their fault, rather than privity.
With very few exceptions,36 Judge Cardozo's rule that tort
31. See id. at 203.
32. See id. at 203-04.

33. 174 N.E. at 445. Judge Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), struck the first major blow against the use of the
privity defense in tort actions seeking recovery for personal injuries caused by defective

products. Judge Cardozo's comment on privity in Ultramares shows, at least in his
respected opinion, that duty, not privity, is the central focus of the economic loss
doctrine.
34. 255 N.Y. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
35. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 707 (4th ed. 1971).
36. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
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law recognizes no duty to avoid negligent infliction of economic
loss has withstood challenge. 7 Judge Cardozo's concern about
the potentially limitless liability of a duty in tort to avoid economic losses remains one of the most persuasive arguments in
favor of the modern economic loss rule. 8 The Fifth Circuit recently rejected a challenge to the economic loss rule in State ex
rel. Guste v. MIV Testbank.9 The Testbank court noted that
the push to delete the restrictions of recovery for economic loss
lost its support and by the early 1940s, had failed. "[I]t is an old
sword that plaintiffs have here picked up."40
Another major impetus behind the development of the economic loss rule was Winterbottom v. Wright,4 1 an 1842 decision
of the English Exchequer that may be one of the most misinterpreted cases in tort history. In Winterbottom the defendant had
a contract to keep a mailcoach in repair. The. plaintiff, a
mailcoach driver, was injured when the mailcoach broke down.
The Exchequer, Lord Abinger, held that the plaintiff could not
maintain an action for breach of contract, but noted in dicta
that "unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to

37. The few courts that have allowed recovery for economic loss in tort have failed
to analyze, or even address, the question of whether such a duty exists. For this reason,
there are few courts that expressly recognize a tort duty to avoid economic harm. There
are many courts, however, that allow recovery without considering this crucial element.
See infra notes 147-170 and accompanying text.
38. Perhaps the clearest example of the problem might arise in cases involving the
closure of a bridge due to its defective design or construction. In such a case, if businesses dependent upon the bridge traffic could sue for lost revenue when the closure
dries up their customer base, then the builder potentially would face enormous liability.
Bridge cases typically are resolved in the defendants' favor, although the rationales used
may vary from lack of duty to foreseeability. See Leadfree Enters., Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 711 F.2d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting need for "sensible stopping point in
order to preclude open-ended, crushing liability on a tortfeasor"); Nebraska Innkeepers,
Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Iowa 1984) (court reluctant
to award damages without showing of damage to person or property in which plaintiff
has "at least some ownership or property interest"); see also Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. v. Indian Head Cattle Co., 290 Or. 909, 627 P.2d 469 (1981) (employer may not recover economic loss from defendant who negligently caused death of employee); Rodriquez v. Carson, 519 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (defendant who negligently destroyed
employer's truck not liable to employee-truck driver for lost wages). See generally Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 I1. 2d 69, 79, 435 N.E.2d 443, 447 (1982) (application of warranty law, rather than strict liability in tort, protects manufacturer from
unlimited liability for economic loss).
39. 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986).
40. Id. at 1023.
41. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outra'
geous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue."42
Lord Abinger's dicta should have been interpreted merely as a
condemnation of an unduly broad third-party beneficiary contract theory or, at most, as the "familiar proposition that not
every duty assumed by contract will sustain an action sounding
in tort."4 Unfortunately, courts quickly interpreted the case to
mean that "a contractor, manufacturer or vendor is not liable to
third parties who have no contractual relations with him for negligence in the construction, manufacture or sale of the articles he
handles."' 44 Thus was born the hobgoblin of twentieth-century

tort law: the privity defense.
2. Economic Loss in Negligence
a. The Problem With Privity
To understand the impact that the rise and fall of the privity defense has had on negligence theory and on the economic
loss rule in particular, the spheres of interests traditionally protected by the law of contracts and by the law of unintentional
torts must be distinguished.
Contract law is designed to enforce the expectancy interests
created by agreement between private parties. The law imposes
no standards to judge each party's performance; the only standards are those that the parties have agreed upon. As such, contract law seeks to enforce standards of quality as defined in the
45
contract.
In contrast, tort law is designed to secure the protection of

42. Id. at 405.
43. Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 32, 517 A.2d 336, 343 (1986). See also Flintkote Co. v. Dravo
Corp., 678 F.2d 942, 945 (11th Cir. 1982) ("In order to maintain an action ex delicto
because of a breach arising out of a contractual relation the breach must be shown to
have been a breach of a duty imposed by law and not merely a duty imposed by the
contract ....
)
44. See Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 867-68 (8th Cir. 1903).
45. See Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. 1978), overruled by
Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo.
1986); Carolina Winds Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d
897 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd on rehearing,No. 25 Davis Adv. Sh. 21 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 30,
1988).
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all citizens from the danger of physical harm to their persons or
to their property. 46 Tort standards are imposed by law without
reference to any private agreement. They obligate each citizen to
exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable physical harm to
others. As such, tort law primarily is concerned with enforcing
standards of conduct.
Within this context, economic interests - particularly those
relating to the quality of a product - are not interests that tort
law traditionally has protected. This view represents the weight
of precedent, and modern courts have affirmed it as a conscious
policy decision. 47 Specifically, the benefit of protecting individuals by shifting the burden of economic loss to manufacturers
through tort law is insufficient to justify the economic impact
such cost-shifting would ha e on society. Manufacturers' prices
would rise as they sought to insure against the possibility that
some of their products would not meet the needs of some of
their customers.4 8
Nevertheless, the privity defense resulting from the misinterpretation of Winterbottom v. Wright49 removed an entire
class of injuries, personal injuries and property damage caused
by negligently manufactured products or structures, from traditional tort protection. Some cases rationalized this anomalous
situation by describing the third party's injuries as beyond the
scope of foreseeable harm. Typical of such cases was Huset v.
J.L Case Threshing Machine Co.50 Huset's employer, J.H. Pifer,
purchased a negligently designed threshing machine from the

46. See Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D. Ind. 1984), afl'd,
771 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985); Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. 1978)
overruled by Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d
901 (Mo. 1986); Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883).
47. See, e.g., Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 335, 581 P.2d 784,
793 (1978); State ex rel. Western Seed Prod. Corp.v. Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 269, 442
P.2d 215, 218 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1968) (superseded by statute as stated
in State ex rel. La Manufacture Frangaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Wells, 294 Or.
296, 657 P.2d 207 (1982)).
48. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17,
23 (1965); see also Spring Motor Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 579-80, 489
A.2d 660, 672-73 (1985) (court's evaluation of "policy choices about the relative roles of
contracts and tort law as the source of legal obligations" leads to the conclusion that
"contract law . . . provides the more appropriate system for adjudicating disputes arising from frustrated economic expectations").
49. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
50. 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
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defendant-manufacturer. The machine was designed so that the
operator had to walk across the feeder cover to operate it.
Shortly thereafter, as a result of the design, Huset's leg was
mangled in the machine. The trial court dismissed Huset's complaint against the manufacturer, and he appealed. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that tort law places "the duty of
everyone to so act himself and to so use his property as to do no
unnecessary damage to his neighbors." 51 The court, nevertheless,
sustained the manufacturer's use of the privity defense in the
name of Winterbottom v. Wright:
But when a contractor builds a house or a bridge, or a
manufacturer constructs a car or a carriage, for the owner
thereof, under a special contract with him, an injury to any
other person than the owner for whom the article is built and
to whom it is delivered cannot ordinarily be foreseen or reasonably anticipated as the probable result of the negligence in its
construction .... The limits of the liability for negligence and

for breaches of contract in cases of this character are held to be
identical. The general rule is that a contractor, manufacturer,
or vendor is not liable to third parties who have no contractual
relations with him for negligence in the52 construction, manufacture or sale of the articles he handles.

The privity defense provided contractors and manufacturers
with an unearned exemption from the standards of liability imposed by tort law.53 In 1916, however, the New York Court of

51. Id. at 866.
52. Id. at 867-68. Even in Winterbottom v. Wright, the court was careful to point

out that "there is no allegation that the defendant knew that the coach was to be driven
by the plaintiff." 152 Eng. Rep. at 404. This comment suggests that the plaintiff's injury
could not have been foreseeable to the defendant. Huset's complaint was rescued because the Eighth Circuit interpreted it to be an action for fraud, one of the three "exceptions" recognized to the above-cited "general rule" by the court. See Huset, 120 F. at
870-72. The other two exceptions were for an imminently dangerous article "intended to
preserve, destroy or affect human life," such as poison or medicine, and the injury to one
who is invited to use a "defective appliance" upon the owner's premises. Id.
53. One might argue that the special treatment afforded manufacturers by the
courts was motivated by a desire to protect and encourage industry. Indeed, at oral argument before the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Carolina Winds Owners Ass'n v. Joe
Harden Builder, Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd on rehearing,No.
25 Davis Adv. Sh. 21 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1988), the same concern about what the
effect abolition of the economic loss doctrine might have on the construction of low-cost
housing was raised.
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Appeals' decision in MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co. 5 4 began the

process of dismantling the privity defense. In MacPherson the
plaintiff was injured when a defective wheel on his automobile
collapsed. Rather than sue the dealer, MacPherson sought recovery from the manufacturer of the wheel. Writing for the court,
Judge Cardozo brushed aside the privity defense argument and
held that a manufacturer may be held liable in tort, "irrespective of contract," for personal injuries caused by any article that
would be dangerous if negligently made.5 5 The MacPherson
holding later was expanded to permit recovery for property
damage caused by the defective product, even in situations that
posed no threat of personal injury. 6
In the context of the construction industry, however, the
courts developed several other mechanisms besides the privity
defense that shielded contractors from liability for injuries to remote parties. As Dean Prosser observed, "This was a field in
which the ghost of Winterbottom v. Wright died very hard."5
Some jurisdictions prevented remote purchasers of improved realty from recovering damages in tort by invoking the
doctrine of caveat emptor.5 8 Other jurisdictions followed the
common-law doctrine of "merger by deed," whereby all contractual obligations of the builder were deemed satisfied and
"merged" into the final deed at closing.59 Additionally, many
states fashioned a rule known as the "completed and accepted
defense," under which the builders' liability is terminated upon
the completion of his work and acceptance thereof by the
owner.60 Like the privity defense, these defenses became riddled

54. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
55. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1057.
56. See, e.g., Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co., 38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S.W.2d 479
(1954) (spoiled horse food).
57. W. PROSSER, supra note 35, § 104, at 680. In Colorado it was not until 1972 that
the ruling in MacPhersonwas extended to personal injuries resulting from defective construction. See Wright v. Creative Corp. 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972).
58. See, e.g., Wells v. Clowers Constr. Co., 476 So. 2d 105 (Ala. 1985); Collier v.
Sinkoe, 135 Ga. App. 732, 218 S.E.2d 910 (1975) (noting exceptions to rule).
59. See, e.g., P. B. R. Enters. v. Perren, 243 Ga. 280, 253 S.E.2d 765 (1979).
60. See, e.g., Young v. Smith & Kelly Co., 124 Ga. 475, 52 S.E. 765 (1905); Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255, 44 N.E. 457 (1896); Annotation, Negligence of Building or
ConstructionContractoras Condition of Liability Upon His Part for Injury or Damage
to Third Party Occurring After Completion and Acceptance of the Work, 58 A.L.R.2D
865 (1958); see also Kristek v. Catron, 7 Kan. App. 2d 495, 498, 644 P.2d 480, 482 (1982)

("This principle of the non-liability of building contractors to third parties has a long if
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with exceptions and have been rejected outright in most
jurisdictions.6
Properly understood, neither the demise of the privity defense in MacPhersonnor the rejection of other similar defenses
effected an expansion of tort liability. Rather, MacPherson simply restored the application of traditional tort standards to manufacturers and contractors for liability for physical harm to remote parties. It placed manufacturers in the position they
arguably should have occupied all along - subject to a legal
duty of exercising reasonable care to avoid injuring others. 2 The
abolition of the privity defense created no new theory of recovery, but merely eliminated a defense to liability under traditional tort principles.6 3
b.

"Foreseeability"Takes Over the Citadel

In the course of dismantling the privity defense, some

largely discredited history.").
61. See, e.g., Holmes v. Worthey, 159 Ga. App. 262, 282 S.E.2d 919 (1981) (limiting
caveat emptor and rejecting merger by deed), aff'd, 249 Ga. 104, 287 S.E.2d 9 (1982);
Kristek v. Catron, 7 Kan. App. 2d 495, 644 P.2d 480 (1982) (rejecting completed and
accepted defense); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975) (rejecting doctrine
of caveat emptor).
62. The MacPhersonopinion contains nothing to suggest that the sphere of interests protected by tort law was expanded beyond freedom from physical harm. Instead, it
is clear that Judge Cardozo meant merely to return manufacturers within the traditional
scope of tort duties:
[The] presence of a known danger, attendant upon a known use, makes
viligance a duty. We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life
and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of
contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it
ought to be. We have put its source in the law.
217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) (emphasis added).
63. Wright and Nicholas, The Collision of Tort and Contract in the Construction
Industry, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 457, 473 (1987). In a sense, the focus on privity itself was a
spurious issue since the concept neither justified nor explained why recovery in tort
should be denied in certain cases. See Marcil v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 9 Mass.
App. 625, 631 n.5, 403 N.E.2d 430, 434 n.5 (1980) ("We believe that the issue of privity
merely diverts attention from the fundamental issue [of duty]."). Privity was merely a
device chosen by the courts to impose what they believed to be necessary limits on liability in a commercial context. In A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla.
1973), the court characterized privity as "a theoretical device of the common law that
recognizes limitation of liability commensurate with compensation for contractual acceptance of risk." See Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 336, 581 P.2d
784, 794 (1978) (privity was "an unfortunate amalgam of tort and contract principles");
W. PROSSER, supra note 35, § 93, at 623 (privity was "a fetish").
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courts went on to equate the scope of liability in tort with the
foreseeability of harm without regard to the nature of the harm.
These courts permit recovery of economic loss in product and
construction defect cases solely on the ground that such economic loss was "foreseeable" to the manufacturer or contractor.
Typical of these cases is the Florida Court of Appeals' decision
in Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Development Concepts Corp.6 4 In Navajo Circle the plaintiff-condominium association sued a remote
builder and architect for negligence in the construction of a roof.
The plaintiff attempted to recover damages for the roof and the
loss of rentals, as well as consequential damage to exterior and
interior walls. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of
privity. The court of appeals reversed on the following grounds:
The products negligence line of cases was relied on by our
supreme court to expand liability in negligence to those who
supplied services rather than products. Where it is foreseeable
that the plaintiff will suffer the injury sued on, the supplier of
the service has a legal duty to use reasonable care to avoid unreasonable risks to that plaintiff in performance of his
service.65
While the latter statement unquestionably reflects a correct and
well-established rule of negligence law regarding physical injuries, this rule historically has not employed with reference to the
risk of economic harm.
Many cases that rely on foreseeability to impose liability for
economic harm place great emphasis on MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., assuming that privity was the only legal barrier that
prevented the recovery of economic loss damages from remote
parties. Many opinions that rely on MacPhersonshow no awareness of the historic distinction between physical harm and economic loss in negligence. In Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc.66 the

64. 373 So. 2d 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
65. Id. at 691 (citations omitted). It is doubtful that either Navajo Circle or A.R.
Moyer remain valid precedent in Florida following the Florida Supreme Court's decision
in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987), a
case involving defective nuclear steam generators. The court rejected the owner's attempt to recover the cost of repairing the generators under a tort theory, holding that
contract principles - rather than traditional concepts of duty, causation, and foreseeability - furnish the appropriate vehicle to allocate risk of economic harm. Accord AFM
Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
66. 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977).
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Connecticut Supreme Court rejected a homebuilder's privity defense against an owner not in privity with the builder-vendor
(subsequent owner). The subsequent owner complained of the
negligent construction of a septic tank. The court held that the
revolution in the law of negligence, which began with MacPherson and resulted in recognition that privity was not a legitimate
concern in negligence actions, has produced a rule of law that a
builder-vendor should be liable in negligence for foreseeable
damage resulting from a defectively constructed house." Similarly, in A. E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc.'8 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an architect was liable to a remote lessee for his lost profits, damaged reputation, and loss of
goodwill that resulted from the architect's negligently designed
building. The architect argued that the issue should be defined
as whether an architect has a tort duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect remote tenants' future economic losses due to the
condition of the building. The court rejected the architect's argument as "too narrow. ' 69 Instead, the court offered this simple
formula: "A defendant's duty is established when it can be said
that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause
harm to someone. A party is negligent when he commits an act
'
when some harm to someone is foreseeable.

70

The court also rejected a privity defense argument by noting that "the lack of privity does not constitute a policy reason
for not imposing liability where negligence is shown. '1 1 The architect might have replied, however, that the demise of the priv-

ity defense does not constitute a policy reason for imposing liability for a species of loss that was not recoverable before the
privity defense was created.
The Lenox Homes and Link Builders opinions misinterpreted MacPherson by making foreseeability the sole determinant of duty. Foreseeability raises a legal duty of reasonable care

67. Id. at 574-76, 378 A.2d at 602-03.
68. 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974).
69. See id. at 483, 214 N.W.2d at 766.
70. Id. at 484, 214 N.W.2d at 766.
71. Id. at 488, 214 N.W.2d at 769. See also A. R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d
397, 402 (Fla. 1973) (contractor allowed to seek economic damages in tort from a remote
architect; court interpreted MacPhersonas meaning that a party should be liable in negligence, regardless of privity, for any losses, economic or otherwise, suffered by one who
foreseeably may be injured).
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only in the context of foreseeable physical harm. Under traditional negligence concepts, purely economic losses are outside
the scope of recovery regardless of how foreseeable those losses
are. For example, it is eminently foreseeable that one's negligence in rupturing a gas or electric line will cause pecuniary
losses to businesses dependent on that gas;72 negligent damage

to a ship may cost seamen their wages73 and tug owners their
fees;74 damage to a railroad bridge will cause the railroad to lose
money in rerouting its trains. 75 Such liability, however, never has
76

been recoverable in tort.
Many courts that allow foreseeability to govern recovery for
economic loss appear unaware that they are expanding tort liability far beyond the scope of negligence that Judge Cardozo envisioned in MacPherson. Other courts, however, are aware that
permitting recovery for purely economic loss is new ground in
negligence theory, but view recovery of economic loss as a logical
expansion of MacPherson.
Such cases should be distinguished from several recent policy-based decisions in which courts intentionally expanded the
sphere of tort interests and recognized a duty in negligence to
prevent foreseeable economic harm to others. In Ales-Peratis
Foods International,Inc. v. American Can Co. 7 8 the California

72. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957
(5th Cir. 1972); Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903).
73. See In re Great Lakes Towing Co., 395 F. Supp. 810 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Henderson v. Arundel Corp., 262 F. Supp. 152 (D. Md. 1966), aff'd, 384 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1967);
Casado v. Schooner Pilgrim, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1959); Hayes v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 92 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1950);
74. See Dick Meyers Towing Serv. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
75. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. MAV Bayou Lacombe, 597 F.2d 469 (5th
Cir. 1979). In Vicksburg Towing Co. v. Mississippi Marine Transp. Co., 609 F.2d 176 (5th
Cir. 1980), the dock owner's lost profits were recoverable after defendant negligently
damaged his dock. The obvious distinction is that the dock owner had suffered physical
damage to a protected property interest.
76. See, e.g., Morse v. Piedmont Hotel Co., 110 Ga. App. 509, 139 S.E.2d 133
(1964); PPG Indus. v. Bean Dredging, Inc., 447 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1984).
77. See Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C. Morris Assocs., 175 N.J. Super. 341, 344,
418 A.2d 1290, 1292 (Ct. Law Div. 1980) (extending architects' liability from property
damage to economic loss is "the next logical step"), aff'd, 199 N.J. Super. 498, 489 A.2d
1233 (Ct. App. Div. 1985); State ex rel. Western Seed Prods. Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Or.
262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968) (farmers' lost profits due to defective seeds recoverable), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
78. 164 Cal. App. 3d 277, 209 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1985). The defendant, a remote man-
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Court of Appeals created the tort of "negligent interference with
prospective economic advantage. '79 The tort is based on a sixpart foreseeability analysis. Foreseeability is determined by the
following factors: (1) the extent to which the defendant's conduct directly impinged upon the plaintiff's interests; (2) the
foreseeability that the defendant's actions would affect plaintiff's interests; (3) the harm suffered; (4) the closeness of the
causal link between the defendant's actions and plaintiff's injury; (5) the degree of moral blame attributable to the plaintiff's
conduct; and (6) public policy supporting the finding of a duty."
The Ales-Peratis court reasoned that by "focusing judicial
attention 'on the foreseeability of the injury and the nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury,' [the
six-part test] would effectively limit recovery for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage to situations where
a duty of care was reasonably owed and breached."81 The opinion stated that potentially unlimited liability would not be a
problem under the six-part analysis because "here we have a far
higher degree of foreseeability of economic injury and a much
'82
narrower range of potential liability.
In People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail
Corp.8 3 the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically recognized a
duty of care to take reasonable measures to avoid putting at risk
persons whom one should know will suffer economic losses. The
New Jersey court held that recovery for pure economic losses
were limited to those who were "particularly foreseeable in
terms of the type of persons or entities comprising the class, the
certainty or predictability of their presence, the approximate
numbers of those in the class, as well as the type of economic

ufacturer of cans for use in packaging food products, was aware of the plaintiff's particu-

lar needs and how the cans would be used (seafood packaging). When the cans proved to
be defective, the plaintiff sued to recover the cost of the cans and the value of a sales
contract that was lost when the plaintiff was unable to produce its canned abalone.

79. Id. at 290, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
80. Id. at 286, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 922 (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320

P.2d 16 (1958)).
81. Id. at 287, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (quoting J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799,

808, 598 P.2d 60, 65, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 412 (1970)).
82. Id. at 290, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
83. 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985). People Express Airlines suffered a twelvehour business interruption when an airport was closed due to the defendant-railroad's
negligent collision with railroad cars containing explosive gas.
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The court expressed the following res-

ervation, however:
We recognize that some cases will present circumstances
that defy the categorization here devised to circumscribe a defendant's orbit of duty, limit otherwise boundless liability and
define an identifiable class of plaintiffs that may recover. In
these cases, the courts will be required to draw upon notions of
fairness, common sense and morality to fix the line limiting liability as a matter of public policy, rather than an uncritical
application of the principle of particular foreseeability.8 5
The court concluded that it is better to decide questions of economic loss on an ad hoc basis than to cling to a rule that requires "the wholesale rejection of recovery in all cases."86
Other courts have rejected the idea that any theory of economic loss based on "foreseeability," modified or not, can provide useful standards of conduct. In State ex rel. Guste v. M/V
Testbank 87 a mass disaster case arising from the blockage of the
Mississippi River Gulf outlet by a chemical spill, the Fifth Circuit rejected the theory that foreseeability could control recovery for economic loss. Recognizing the need for "pragmatic limitations on the doctrine of foreseeability," the court defended the
use of a bright-line test requiring the presence of personal injury
or property damage as a condition for recovery of economic
loss.88 Judge Higgenbotham's opinion for the majority stressed
the need for "pre-existing normative guidelines "' 89 in judicial decision-making. The court acknowledged that the traditional rule
produces results "at its edge" 90 that seem unfair. Nevertheless, it
could discern no effective limiting principle that would substitute the requirement of physical injury in producing a predictable rule of law. Citing the limits on a court's ability to adjudi-

84. Id. at 264, 495 A.2d at 116. The People Express ruling recently was adopted by
the Alaska Supreme Court in Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356
(Alaska 1987), in which a contractor was allowed to sue the defendant-owner for loss of
income and profits suffered as a result of the loss of his employees' services. The employees were injured in a trench collapse, allegedly caused by the owner's negligence.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 254, 495 A.2d at 111.
87. 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied., 477 U.S. 903 (1986).
88. Id. at 1025.
89. Id. at 1028.
90. Id. at 1029,
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cate, the opinion stated that without limits on foreseeability,
each judge or jury would decide for itself whose damages are too
remote or tenuous for recovery, and the result will be "judicial"
only in the sense that it draws on the resources of the
judiciary."1
The conflicting opinions of People Express and Testbank
arm advocates on both sides of the economic loss rule debate
with persuasive authority. The issue - the need for practical
limits on liability for economic loss and the problem in defining
a standard of conduct to prevent economic harm - is crucial to
the debate over recovery in tort for construction defects. That
issue will be discussed later in this article.
3. Economic Loss in Strict Liability: A Contest of Wills
The issue of economic loss in strict products liability has
received extensive treatment in case law and academic writings.92 Although the use of strict liability only rarely has met
with success in the construction context, 93 the policy arguments
advanced in the strict products liability debate have had a
profound influence on the litigation of economic loss in construction defect cases.
Strict liability theory originated as a contract-based implied
warranty theory because consumers injured by mass-produced
consumer products experienced difficulty in proving liability
under a fault-based negligence theory. Recovery under implied
warranty theory, however, often was defeated by disclaimer, requirements of notice, or by the privity defense. As the privity
defense began to erode, the implied warranty theory became a
contract theory without a contract. Eventually, most courts
abandoned the fiction of warranty and christened a new tort ac94
tion: strict liability.

91. Id. at 1028-29.
92. See infra notes 136-147; see also Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery
of Economic Loss in American Products Liability, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 647 (1977).
93. See infra notes 129-146 and accompanying text.
94. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966). See also
Sacramento Regional Transit Dist. v. FIxible, 158 Cal. App. 3d 289, 295-96, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 736, 740 (1984) (the development of strict liability is "an example of necessary
judicial paternalism"). Strict liability has been justified on several grounds. One justifica-

tion is consumers' lack of bargaining power against large remote manufacturers. See
Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 575, 489 A.2d 660, 670 (1985).
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The heart of strict liability is the notion of protecting consumers from unreasonable dangers to their person or their property. As codified in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 5 the doctrine of strict liability imposes liability when a
defective product that is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer results in physical harm. When the danger results in
physical injury to the consumer or to his property, recovery is
permitted regardless of fault."
The problem that has vexed courts and scholars is whether
damage to the product itself qualifies as "physical harm" within
the meaning of section 402A. The two opposing views on this
issue were set out in the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision
in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc.9 7 and the California Supreme Court's decision in Seely v. White Motor Co.9e
In Santor the plaintiff sued a carpet manufacturer for the
cost of defective carpet. The court rejected the economic loss
rule holding that there was "no just cause" for permitting recovery for personal injuries in some cases but denying recovery in
others simply because loss of value is the only damage sustained.99 The Santor court identified four policy reasons favoring recovery of economic losses. First, the rule was inefficient; if
consumers were restricted to their contract rights against intermediate sellers, then an "unduly wasteful process of litigation" 100 would result as sellers, in turn, sued manufacturers. Second, consumers have neither the competence nor the
opportunity to inspect the article for defects.101 Third, the mere
presence of the article on the market constitutes a representation that it is suitable and safe for its intended use. 02 Fourth,
Another justification is the social desirability of spreading the cost of catastrophic personal injuries to consumers as a class through insurance or an incremental increase in the
price of manufacturers' products. See id. at 568, 489 A.2d at 666; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 389-404, 161 A.2d 69, 86-95 (1960); Star Furniture Co. v.
Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 856 (W. Va. 1982).
95. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 402A. See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
96. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 402A.
97. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
98. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
99. 44 N.J. at 59, 207 A.2d at 309.
100. Id. at 62, 207 A.2d at 310.
101. Id. at 64, 207 A.2d at 311.
102. Id.
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the manufacturer is in a better position to bear the cost of injury
than the injured or damaged persons who ordinarily are powerless to protect themselves. 1"3 The opinion implies that a distinction between property damage and product damage is an arbitrary one.
In Seely the California Supreme Court staked out the contrary position. In that case, the plaintiff purchased a truck that
subsequently overturned due to defective brakes. The plaintiff
incurred repair costs and lost profits as a result of the accident.
The Seely court affirmed the judgment against the defendantseller on a breach of express warranty theory, but rejected the
defendant's argument that the doctrine of strict liability "superseded" the scheme of warranty remedies established by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 0 4 The court held that the doc-

trine of strict liability was intended to govern only the "distinct
problem of physical injuries"'10 5 and was not intended to undermine the UCC's regulation of economic injuries. The court further recognized that the basic interest protected by warranty
law, the quality of the product, is better served by contract remedies and principles:
Although the rules of warranty frustrate rational compensation for physical injury, they function well in a commercial
setting. These rules determine the quality of the product the
manufacturer promises and thereby determine the quality he
must deliver....
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic
loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one
plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the
responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing
his products. He can appropriately be held liable for physical
injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a
standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create
unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of
performance of his products in the consumer's business unless
he agrees that the product was designed to meet the con-

103. Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312.
104. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15, 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (1965).

105. Id.
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sumer's demands.0 8
Finally, the Seely court noted that the loss-shifting rationale of
strict liability loses its significance in cases when the injury is
purely economic. While the risk of personal injury to the individual is a risk that society fairly may impose upon the manufacturer, who then will spread it among the public in the form of
higher prices, the loss-shifting rationale "in no way justifies requiring the consuming public to pay more for their products so
that a manufacturer can insure against the possibility that some
of his products will not meet the business needs of some of his
07
customers.'
The debate over economic loss in products liability cases involves one element missing from earlier economic loss cases,
namely, the courts' concern over impinging on the legislature's
power as manifested by the enactment of the UCC. This contest
of wills between judicial paternalism and the legislature has
taken a decisive turn in favor of the legislature. A clear majority
of courts that have considered the issue have adopted the position taken by the Seely court and retained retention of the economic loss doctrine.' 0 8 Reluctance to allow tort remedies that
produce results contrary to the intricate UCC warranty scheme
has led many courts to reject the use of strict liability theories in
the commercial context altogether.' 0 9 In fact, even the New
Jersey Supreme Court has retreated from its holding in Santor
in commercial cases.11n
C.

The "Sudden and Dangerous" Test: All Product Injuries
Are Not Created Equal

Thus far, the economic loss doctrine has been portrayed as
a bright-line rule. Indeed, many courts employ the doctrine in
bright-line form."' In the past several years, however, an inter-

106. Id. at 16, 18, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23 (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
108. See, e.g., Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 575, 489 A.2d
660, 669-70 (1985) (collecting cases).
109. See id.; James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1983). Contra
Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
111. See, e.g., State ex rel. Guste v. MNT Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.
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mediate form has emerged, which permits recovery in tort for
damage to the work product itself under certain circumstances.
The intermediate position was originated by the Alaska Supreme Court. In Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc."2 the plaintiff was denied recovery for a mobile home with a defective furnace, a leaky roof, a leaky bathroom, and several cracked
windows. The court relied on Seely in denying recovery in strict
14
liability. 1 3 One year later in Cloud v. Kit Manufacturing Co.1
the court permitted the plaintiff to recover damages in strict liability when a defective electric heater in a mobile home caused
the sudden destruction of a mobile home by fire. After distinguishing Morrow as a case involving a "lemon" rather than an
unsafe product, the court identified situations in which the damage to the product itself might qualify as compensable "property
damage" rather than economic loss: "We cannot lay down an all
inclusive rule to distinguish between the two categories; however, we note that sudden and calamitous damage will almost
always result in direct property damage and that deterioration,
internal breakage and depreciation will be considered economic
' 115
lOSS."

The Alaska Supreme Court clarified the two opinions in
Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co. 1 16 Northern Power was a products liability case in which the
oil pressure shut-off valve of a diesel-powered electric generator
failed and caused severe damage to the generator's engine. The
court rejected the idea that the "sudden and calamitous" language of Cloud was intended as a test to determine what constitutes "property damage." 11 Instead, the court held that recovery in tort for damage to the product was justified when the loss
takes place in a manner that creates danger to persons or other
property, even though the actual damage ultimately is confined
to the product itself.118 Therefore, the court reasoned that although the damage occurred in a sudden manner, the destruc-

1983).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
Id. at 285-86.
563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
Id. at 251.
623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981).
See id. at 328 n.5.
See id. at 329.
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tion of the diesel generator posed no threat of harm to anything
or anyone but the product itself, and recovery of the damage
should be denied under a theory of negligence or strict liability."'9 In other words, if the product is damaged under circumstances that could have caused physical harm to other persons
or property, then the plaintiff might be able to recover for a
purely economic loss. Other courts have adopted the Northern
20
Power theory, albeit with modifications.

The sudden and dangerous test has been criticized because
the test arguably is unjustified and unworkable.' In East River

119. See id.
120. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d
1165, 1174 (3d Cir. 1981); Moorman Mfg. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d
443 (1982). In Pennsylvania Glass the Third Circuit proposed to draw the line between
tort and contract by
analyzing interrelated factors such as the nature of the defect, the type of risk,
and the manner in which the injury arose. These factors bear directly on
whether the safety-insurance policy of tort law or the expectation-bargain protection policy of warranty law is most applicable to a particular claim.
652 F.2d at 1173.
In other words, the sudden and dangerous test seeks to distinguish between "the disappointed users. . . and the endangered ones." See Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587,
595, 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1978) (product loss recoverable if it was a consequence of the
kind of danger and occured under the kind of circumstances, accidental or not, that
created an unreasonable danger to person or property). See also Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (citing Pennsylvania Glass), affd, 771 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1985); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253
(1983) (characterizing Pennsylvania Glass as an "accident exception" to the economic
loss rule); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982)
(citing Pennsylvania Glass).
121. See Ribstein, Guidelines For Deciding Product Liability Cases, 29 MERCER L.
REV. 493, 500 (1978). The difficulty in using the economic loss rule is illustrated in
Kishwaukee Community Health Servs. Center v. Hospital Bldg. & Equip. Co., 638 F.
Supp. 1492 (U.D. Ill. 1986), in which the courts stated:
One could reasonably interpret this discussion of economic loss to approve
one (or more) of three different tests. A loss is not "economic" and a plaintiff
may sue in tort if(1) the damage alleged involves anything outside of the product itself (the
"bright line" test);
(2) one would not expect the resulting damage to be caused by the product's failure to perform its intended function (the "commercial expectation"
test); or

(3) the damage occurred in a sudden and dangerous manner (the "sudden
and dangerous" test).
The last, [sic) test, the "sudden and dangerous" test, could in turn be divided
into "potential" and "actual" tests; it is unclear whether the majority's discussion of sudden and dangerous occurrences treats resulting damages as economic loss if the event did cause grave harm or could have caused great harm.
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Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.'22 the United
States Supreme Court addressed the economic loss doctrine in
the context of an admiralty case. A set of ship turbines costing
$1.4 million disintegrated because the manufacturer negligently
installed certain key components backwards. A unanimous
Court rejected recovery for economic loss in negligence and
strict liability. The court stated that contract and tort law were
separate, that the economic loss rule operated to separate them,
and that the rule was necessary to maintain a realistic limit on
damages awards. The court reasoned that when a product injures only itself, the tort concern with safety is less and "the
reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving
the party to its contractual remedies are strong."' 12 3
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, further rejected
the sudden and dangerous test. The opinion stated that the test
was "too indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to structure their business behavior."' 24 The opinion also stated that regardless of the manner in which the damage to the product itself
occurs, gradually or through accident, the nature of the loss is
"the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain
125
- traditionally the core concern of contract law.'
In the fourth edition of his treatise on the law of torts, Dean
Prosser described an automobile destroyed by its own defective
brakes as an example of the rule that "the seller's liability for
negligence covers any kind of physical harm, including. . . damage to the defective chattel itself.' 1 26 By the time of the fifth

edition, that view had changed radically:
Making liability depend upon whether or not the loss results
from an "accident" creates a difficult issue and arguably an irrelevant issue with respect to the validity of contract provisions allocating the risk of loss for harm to the defective prod-

Id. at 1497. The court also noted that under any test - "sudden and dangerous" or
otherwise - the recovery of damages for economic loss is inconsistent with the major
thrust of the economic loss doctrine. Economic losses, the court reasoned, were essentially the failure to receive the "benefit of the bargain," no matter how they were caused.
See id. at 1498.
122. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
123. Id. at 871.
124. Id. at 870.
125. Id.
126. W. PROSSER, supra note 35, § 101, at 665.
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uct itself to the purchaser. Distinguishing "accidental" damage
to the product from mere economic loss is difficult in many
cases .... 12

A variant of the sudden and dangerous test appeared in
Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. WhitingTurner Contracting Co. 128 In Atlantis Condominium the plain-

tiff, a condominium association, sued a remote architect and
builder, alleging that their negligence in design and construction

resulted in a fire hazard that created a risk of personal injury.
No "accident" or damage to persons or other property had occurred. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that when a dangerous condition is discovered before it results in injury, an ac-

tion in negligence will lie for
the recovery of the reasonable cost
29
of correcting the condition.
This idea has been rejected in several jurisdictions. 30 In
Carolina Winds Owners' Association v. Joe Harden Builder,

Inc. 1 ' the South Carolina Court of Appeals considered the argument in a a fact situation similar to the one in Atlantis Condominium. The Carolina Winds court found several practical
problems with a theory that would allow recovery in tort for the
127. W.KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 101(3), at 709 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. In as early as
1978, Dean Keeton wrote that while a "hazardous product that has harmed something or
someone can be labeled as part of the accident problem[,] .

.

. a damaging event that

harms only the product should be treated as irrelevant to policy considerations directing
liability placement in tort." Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 5
(1978). See also Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703
S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (crane owner denied recovery for the crane's sudden
destruction by its own defective counterweight).
128. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986).
129. See id. at 35, 517 A.2d at 345.
130. The Maryland Court of Appeals stands alone in permitting recovery in tort for
the mere risk of harm. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 127, § 101, at 710. See National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 789, 332 N.W.2d 39, 44 (1983)
(court rejected plaintiff's argument that he should be able to sue in tort to recover expenses undertaken to repair defective parts to "remove a potential future liability in
tort" - the danger of a crane collapse); Crowell Corp. v. Topkis Constr. Co., 280 A.2d
730 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (court rejected similar argument by observing that plaintiff's
duty to prevent risk of harm to others is not dependent upon his right to sue others in
tort for the cost of removing that risk); see also People ex rel. Skinner v. Graham, 170
Ill. App. 3d 417, 524 N.E.2d 642 (1988); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co.,
656 F. Supp. 49, 59 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (plaintiff cannnot avoid economic loss doctrine by
alleging "mere prospect of catastrophe" at nuclear power plant).
131. 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd on rehearing, No. 25 Davis
Adv. Sh. 21 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1988).
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mere risk of personal injury. First, such a theory is inconsistent
with the principle that damages must occur before negligence is
actionable. 13 2 Second, the fact and extent of the injury and the
identity of persons who may be affected are wholly speculative
until actual injury occurs. 3 3 Third, no limiting mechanism ensures that the damages recovered will bear a reasonable relationship to the risk of injury.' The court stated:
The difficulty is that there is no principled way to categorize
types or degrees of risk for the purpose of establishing liability.
To say the determination should be made on a case by case
basis is to abandon the attempt at rule governed decision making in favor of ad hoc, post hoc imposition of liability by judges
and juries. The calculation of risk. . . is far beyond the competence of judges or juries ....
[Tihere is no guarantee that
tort rules of liability, if they could be fashioned, would 5redis13
tribute these risks in the most rational, economic way.

III.

RECOVERY OF EcONoMIc Loss IN CONSTRUCTION DEFECT
LITIGATION

A.

Recovery Under Strict Liability Theory

Even in jurisdictions that permit the recovery of economic
loss, strict liability has been considered inappropriate for use in
a construction context. In Conolley v. Bull'3 6 the California Supreme Court rejected the use of strict liability in a homeowner's
suit against a builder who had constructed a house on poor soil.
The court found the policy elements that justify strict liability
in product defect actions did not apply in a construction context. It reasoned that unlike a manufacturer, a builder lacks the
opportunity to limit or disclaim liability to subsequent purchasers; tracing the source of the defect is easy, and further, the
plaintiff has the opportunity to conduct a meaningful inspection
of the premises.
Other courts, however, have permitted subse-

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 87, 374 S.E.2d at 904-05.
Id. at 87, 374 S.E.2d at 905.
Id. at 87-88, 374 S.E.2d at 905.
Id. at 88, 374 S.E.2d at 905.
258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1968).
Id. at 196, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
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quent purchasers to recover economic loss damages from home
13

builders.

Some courts have permitted plaintiffs to recover for 'defective mobile homes."3 " This is not an unreasonable position, given
that mobile homes bear more resemblance to the products that
traditionally have been the subject of strict liability than to a
typical building. Mobile homes are mass-produced and marketed
like manufactured products. Further, the manufacturer has complete control over the design and construction, unlike the contractor who must share control with the owner and his
40
architect.1
The use of strict liability to recover economic loss has been
rejected in the construction context for a variety of reasons.
Some courts have focused on the inapplicability of the strict lia-

138. The California Court of Appeals later allowed a subsequent homeowner to sue
the builder in strict liability for diminution in value and cost of repairs to the house as a
result of a defective heating system. See Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App.
2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969). Even so, the Kriegler court did not cite Conolly but,
instead, relied on an earlier New Jersey decision, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J.
70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), which permitted recovery for damages under a strict liability
theory for personal injury caused by a defective hot water system in a mass-produced
home.
The court justified the use of strict liability to builders for the following reasons: (1)
the purchaser's reliance on advertised model homes and an implied representation that
the builder's skill produced a home reasonably fit for its intended purpose; (2) the purchaser's disadvantage because of unequal bargaining power between the parties; and (3)
the purchaser's lack of the expertise to inspect the premises adequately for defects. See
Kriegler,269 Cal. App. 2d at 228, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752-53. The Kreigler case is probably
best regarded as an anomaly, however. In Huang v. Garner, 157 Cal. App. 3d 404, 203
Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984), the California Court of Appeals summarily rejected the use of
strict liability by a group of apartment owners seeking recovery from a remote contractor, developer, and architect for the cost of correcting structural defects. See also Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 433, 437 A.2d 925, 929-30 (Ct. Law. Div. 1981) (trial
court, which permitted subsequent homeowner to recover damages from a builder in
strict liability for flooding and cracked foundations in the basement, stated that "privity
of contract is not an element in a products liability action").
139. See, e.g., Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Hiigel v. General
Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); Gautheir v. Mayo, 77 Mich. App. 513,
258 N.W.2d 748 (1977); Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes Corp., 198 Mont. 461, 647
P.2d 334 (1982).
140. See Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 573, 378 A.2d 599, 602 (1977)
(rejecting use of strict liability in a case involving an ordinary house, court noted that "a
house which is not the product of a mass marketing scheme or which is not designed as a
temporary dwelling differs from the usual item to which the principles of strict liability
have generally been applied").
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bility theory. For example, in Wright v. Creative Corp.14 1 the
Colorado Court of Appeals noted that typically, no problem exists in finding or proving negligence in construction of a structure due to the purchaser's opportunity to make a meaningful
inspection of a structure on real property. Further, the builder
cannot disclaim or limit his liability as easily as a commercial
142
manufacturer.
Other courts have permitted defendants to use the economic loss doctrine defense to defend successfully against strict
liability claims for economic losses arising from construction defects. Typically, these courts cite the products liability cases
that uphold the economic loss doctrine. 143 In Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.'4 the court rejected a
claim for damages against an architect and roof manufacturer
when the roof system of the plaintiff's factory cracked and blew
off. The court opined that economic loss almost always is incurred by the product's owner - the very person who is in the
best position to bargain for warranty protection or a lower con45
tract price.
In Oliver v. City Builders, Inc. 4 6 the Mississippi Supreme
Court anticipated that strict liability claims against remote
builders could result in the possibility of a windfall for subsequent owners. If the original purchaser could be estopped from
complaining about the durability of a structure due to his delib-

erate choice of the quality and type of construction, the court

141. 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972).
142. Id. at 582-83, 498 P.2d at 1182-83. See also Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49, 58-59 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (court found a strict liability claim
to be inappropriate in commercial dispute over a nuclear power plant).
143. See, e.g., Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc., 142 Ariz. 439, 690 P.2d 158 (1984);
State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984); Local Joint Executive
Bd. Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 651 P.2d 637 (1982); Richman v. Albert, 127 A.D.2d 992, 513 N.Y.S.2d 46 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Lupinski v. Heritage Homes, Ltd., 369 Pa. Super. 488, 535 A.2d 656 (1988); Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977) (denying recovery in strict liability but affirming award of
damages under negligence theory, which was not challenged on appeal).
144. 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980).
145. Id. at 288-89.
146. 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974). The court in Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439
So. 2d 670 (Miss. 1983), allowed recovery of economic loss in negligence relying on a
rationale that contradicts many of the statements made in Oliver. Even so, no court has
ever expressly overruled the holding in Oliver that strict liability is not available to recover economic losses for a construction defect.
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reasoned that a subsequent purchaser should stand in no better
position. Moreover, the court saw no way to create a rule permitting recovery in residential cases that could not
be applied
14 7
equally to cases involving commercial structures.

B. Recovery Under Negligence Theory
Owners seeking recovery of economic losses have had
greater success by using negligence theories than by using strict
liability theories. Cases permitting recovery of economic losses
due to construction defects may be grouped into several categories. At one end of the spectrum are those cases that permit recovery of economic losses with no analysis at all. 4 8 In such
cases, both the courts and the litigants seem entirely unaware
that the damages sought were outside the scope of traditional
tort protection. The economic loss issue is neither raised, discussed, nor decided. These decisions generally are not given
precedential weight, nor should they be. 49
A number of construction cases focus their attention on criticizing the barriers to recovery: privity, 50 caveat emptor,'5 ' and
the "completed and accepted" defense. 152 These cases analyze
only half of the problem because they do away with existing obstacles to recovery without inquiring whether other conceptual
or policy reasons may exist to deny recovery. Thus, in Moxley v.

147. 303 So. 2d at 468-69.

148. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Columbia Realty-Woodland Park & Co., 41 Colo. App. 453,
590 P.2d 73 (1978); Kincaid v. Landing Dev. Corp., 289 S.C. 89, 344 S.E.2d 869 (Ct. App.
1986); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
149. For examples of such cases, see James v. Bell Helicopter, Inc., 715 F.2d 166,
172 (5th Cir. 1983); Marcil v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 625, 631
n.4, 403 N.E.2d 430, 434 n.4 (1980); Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, Inc., 350 N.W.2d
591, 595 (N.D. 1984); Carolina Winds Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 297 S.C.
74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988), afl'd on rehearing,No. 25 Davis Adv. Sh. 21 (S.C. Ct.
App. Nov. 30, 1988) (distinguishing Terlinde); Other cases that have limited precedential

value are those in which precedent supporting the economic loss doctrine was available
but the court and litigants did not apply it to their case. See e.g., Gupta v. Ritter Homes,
Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168, 168 (Tex. 1983) (Texas Supreme Court affirmed the negligence
ruling in Gupta, but only because parties abandoned issue in their appeal to that court).
But see Jim Walters Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1986) (Texas does not
allow recovery in negligence for economic losses arising in the construction context).
150. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Laramie Builders, Ind.153 the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled

that the doctrine of caveat emptor could not be used as a defense to a claim for negligent construction asserted by a remote
purchaser. The court recognized the practical legal difficulties
that would result from eliminating the barrier between contract
and tort, but simply deferred resolution of those problems to an54
other day.1
Several courts have allowed recovery after overruling the
"completed and accepted" defense. The defense insulates builders from liability for any losses occurring after the structure is
completed and turned over to its first owner. In Simmons v.
Owens155 the court allowed a subsequent purchaser to sue the
builder for wood rot and termite infestation caused by excessively low clearance of the exterior siding. After eliminating the
completed and accepted defense, the Florida Court of Appeals
justified recovery by stating that the ordinary purchaser of a
home is not qualified to determine when or where a defect
5

exists.1 1

Courts, without addressing or recognizing any fundamental
difference between recovery for economic loss and recovery for
personal injuries, also have permitted recovery after striking
down the privity defense.157 Typical of these cases is Juliano v.
Gaston.58 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
a remote subcontractor. The plaintiff, a homeowner, claimed the
subcontractor's negligence resulted in extensive damages. The
appellate court, in reversing the summary judgment, held that
"there is no impediment, conceptual or practical, to the recovery
of this category of damages in a negligence action by the pur153. 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
154. "We have no idea what defenses may be interposed [to such a negligence claim]
or what our views might be as to any such defenses presented upon a full development of
this case in the trial court." Id. at 736.
155. 363 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
156. The court relied on an exception to that defense for latent dangerous conditions or unreasonable risks. It offered no explanation for its conclusion that rotted exterior siding presents a danger to the occupants of a house. See id. at 143; see also Kristek
v. Catron, 7 Kan. App. 2d 495, 496-98, 644 P.2d 480, 482-83 (1982) (in reaching a similar
result, court saw no reason, other than the discredited concept of privity, to bar recovery
for economic losses).
157. See, e.g., Oates v. JAG, Inc., 314 N.C. 276, 333 S.E.2d 222 (1985); Dellinger v.
Lamb, 79 N.C. App. 404, 339 S.E.2d 480 (1986); Newman v. Tualatin Dev. Co., 287 Or.
47, 597 P.2d 800 (1979).
158. 187 N.J. Super. 491, 455 A.2d 523 (Ct. App. Div. 1982).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

33

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

chaser against a subcontractor." 159 The Juliano court relied extensively on Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 160 in which the issue
was not one of negligence but whether recovery under the theory
of an implied warranty of fitness for habitability should be extended to subsequent purchasers.1 "' The Barnes court, however,
expressed sentiments that have been quoted repeatedly in negligence cases such as Juliano:
The contention that a distinction should be drawn between
mere "economic loss" and personal injury is without merit.
Why there should be a difference between an economic loss resulting from injury to property and an economic loss resulting
from personal injury has not been revealed to us .... We fail

to see any rational reason for such a distinction.
If there is a defect in a stairway and the purchaser repairs
the defect and suffers an economic loss, should he fail to recover because he did not wait until he or some member of his
family fell down the stairs and broke his neck? Does the law
penalize those who are alert and prevent injury? Should it not
put those who prevent personal162 injury on the same level as
those who fail to anticipate it?

Such a sentiment is easy to understand but has been criticized
as a "false dilemma."' 6 3 There is no reason for the homeowner to

wait until a personal injury occurs to exercise his contract remedies. More importantly, as the dissenting judges noted in
Barnes, it simply fails to address the commercial impact of al-

159. Id. at 498, 455 A.2d at 526.

160. 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
161. Although most courts follow the majority view of denying recovery in tort for
economic losses, some will permit recovery for such losses under the implied warranty
theory. See Sheed, The Implied Warranty of Habitability:New Implications,New Applications,8 REAL EST. L.J. 291 (1980); Annotation, Liability of Builder-Vendor or Other
Vendor of New Dwelling for Loss, Injury or Damage Occasioned by Defective Condition
Thereof, 25 A.L.R.3D 383 (1969). To the extent that recovery is permitted in implied
warranty without a showing of privity, the theory becomes in effect "strict liability" and
is subject to the same criticisms and shortcomings as recovery under a tort theory. See
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 187-88, 441 N.E.2d 324, 332 (1982) (Ryan, C.J.,
dissenting). But see Lemke v. Dagenois, 130 N.H. 742, 792-95, 547 A2d 290, 296-98
(1988) (permitting recovery of economic loss under implied warranty of workmanship
theory for latent defects for a reasonable period of time).
162. 264 Ind. 729, 230, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1976).
163. See Carolina Winds Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 297 SC 74, 374
S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988), afl'd on rehearing,No. 25 Davis Adv. Sh. 21 (S.C. Ct. App.
Nov. 30, 1988).
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lowing tort law to upset the allocation of risk expectancies under
a contractual agreement between the parties.""
Some courts recognize that economic loss traditionally has
not been a protected interest under tort law, but view recovery
of economic harm as the logical result of the elimination of the
privity defense. 6 15 In Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller 66 the
court upheld a subsequent homeowner's negligence claim against
the original builder for settlement, cracking, and movement of
the foundation. The court justified its decision largely on consumer-protection grounds, citing the builder's superior knowledge, the homeowner's inability to inspect for defects, and the
tremendous impact that a defective home might have on the
"family budget.' 6 7 Significantly, the court limited recovery in
tort to cases of latent or hidden defects, reasoning that the
buyer already may have received a reduced price to reflect patently obvious deterioration or deficiencies. The dissenting
judges criticized the majority's failure to distinguish between the
question of to whom the duty is owed and the question of what
duty is owed.' They argued that the flaw in the majority opinion lies in its assumption that a legal duty has been breached
merely because the damages are foreseeable. The dissenters fur-

164. See 264 Ind. at 232-33, 342 N.E.2d at 621-22 (Debuler, J., dissenting). A federal
court applying Indiana law in a negligence action later distinguished Barnes on the
grounds that it was an implied warranty case and that the Barnes court, therefore, was
not required to consider the collision between tort and contract principles represented by
the Uniform Commercial Code. See Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893, 897
(S.D. Ind. 1984) (federal court found the existing precedent "inconclusive" and determined that Indiana would uphold the economic loss doctrine in a products liability context), aff'd, 771 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1985).
165. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916);
see also supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
166. 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983).
167. See id. at 1045; see also Drexel Properties, Inc., v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406 So. 2d 515, 520 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981) (recovery of economic losses in tort
will deter sloppy workmanship); Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So. 2d 670, 672
(Miss. 1983) (damages recovery permitted to protect innocent purchasers from a major
financial catastrophe against which they have no practical means of protecting themselves); McMillan v. Brune-Harpeneau-Torbeck Builders, Inc., 8 Ohio St. 3d 3, 5, 455
N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (1983) (permitting recovery of economic losses in tort encourages better workmanship and accountability of contractors). But see Oliver v. City Builders, Inc.,
303 So. 2d 466, 468 (Miss. 1974) (court noted that purchaser may protect himself against
misfortune by insisting on a warranty and warned that adoption of rule to protect homeowner would apply with equal force to structures of every kind).
168. See id. at 1046 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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ther characterized the builder's duty of workmanlike construction as one arising solely in contract.16 9 Finally, the dissent
noted that the majority's holding could not be limited to
homebuilders except by judicial fiat and criticized the latent defect requirement as "the sheerest form of ipse dixit,"'' 70 without
foundation in the principles of tort law.
Another group of cases employs an analysis that makes foreseeability the determinant of liability for economic harm. Some
courts do not address the question of whether the duty to avoid
economic harm, however foreseeable, is within the traditional
tort concepts of duty.' Other courts, while addressing the issue,
use foreseeability to create a tort duty for prevention of eco17 2
nomic harm.

These latter courts use the six-factor analysis employed in
Ales-Peratis Foods International,Inc. v.American Can Co.,

73

to determine whether the eonomic loss was a forseeable consequence of the negligence on the part of construction contractors.
In these cases, the liability runs to subsequent owners or tenants
of the structures the contractors build. In J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory174 the California Supreme Court found a landlord's renovation contractor liable in negligence for the lost profits of a tenant whose restaurant was closed due to the contractor's delay in
completing his work. In finding that there was a "special relationship" between the contractor and the tenant, the court focused on the foreseeability of economic harm as the "key component" and "primary consideration" in establishing a duty. 75 The
court held that resolving such cases on a case-by-case basis, focusing judicial attention on foreseeability, proximate cause, and

169. See id. at 1048-49.
170. Id. at 1050. See supra notes 146-147.
171. See, e.g., Parliament Towers Condominium v. Parliament House Realty, Inc.,
377 So. 2d 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Quail Hollow E. Condominium Ass'n v. Donald
J. Scholz Co., 47 N.C. App. 518, 525, 268 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1980) (finding a distinction
between economic loss and property damage "neither dispositive nor persuasive"); Keel
v. Titan Constr. Corp., 639 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1981); American Reciprocal Insurers v. Bessonette, 241 Or. 500, 405 P.2d 529 (1965).
172. See, e.g., Ales-Paratis Foods Int'l, Inc. v. American Can Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d
277, 209 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1985); J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157
Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
173. 164 Cal. App. 3d 277, 209 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1985). See supra notes 78-83.
174. 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
175. Id. at 806, 598 P.2d at 64, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
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the nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's
injury, is preferable to a rule that bars recovery of economic loss
in all cases."' 6
As might be expected from courts following established
rules of law, there is far greater uniformity of rationale in those
cases that follow the economic loss doctrine. In general, these
courts emphasize the social desirability of allowing parties to define expectancy interests and allocate risk through contract
without interference from legally imposed tort standards.
Courts also deny recovery for economic losses on the basis
of such defenses as caveat emptor.'" Other courts deny recovery
under a straightforward analysis that recognizes that economic
loss simply is not within the range of interest protected by
tort.178 Persuaded by products liability cases enforcing the eco-

nomic loss doctrine, courts of Georgia and Idaho have denied
recovery in tort for construction defects.' 79
In Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed 80 the Texas Supreme
Court held that a claim for negligent supervision in the construction of a home, which results solely in economic loss, can be

176. Id. at 807-08, 598 P.2d 60 at 64-65, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 412. See also Huang v.
Garner, 157 Cal. App. 3d 404, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984) (allowed recovery in negligence
but not in strict liability). A similar analysis was followed in Brown v. Fowler, 279
N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1979), when a subsequent purchaser sued the builder for structural
problems resulting from construction of a house on ten feet of fill dirt. In applying the
six-part forseeability test, the court recognized that imposing a duty on the part of the
builder is essentially a policy determination. See id. at 909. See generally Hawthorne v.
Kober Constr. Co., 196 Mont. 519, 640 P.2d 467 (1982) (court permitted subcontractorplaintiff to recover damages for defendant-suppliers' negligent performance of a supply
contract with the general contractor).
177. See, e.g., Woolridge v. Rowe, 477 So. 2d 296 (Ala. 1985); Wells v. Clower Constr. Corp., 476 So. 2d 105 (Ala. 1985); see also Holmes v. Worthey, 159 Ga. App. 262, 282
S.E.2d 919 (1981) (caveat emptor still the rule for defects that are discoverable through
ordinary diligence), af'd, 249 Ga. 104, 287 S.E.2d 9 (1982).
178. See, e.g., Crowell Corp. v. Topkis Constr. Co., 280 A.2d 730 (Del. Super. Ct.
1971); Lumber Prods., Inc. v. Hiriart, 255 So. 2d 783 (La. Ct. App. 1971). In Local Joint
Executive Bd. Culinery Workers Union Local 226 v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 651 P.2d 637
(1982), the court denied recovery of lost wages for the employees of the MGM Hotel
from the architect whose negligence allegedly caused the fire that destroyed the hotel.
The court was not distracted by the economic loss debate surrounding product liability;
it relied on early maritime cases and Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200
(Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
179. See McClain v. Harveston, 152 Ga. App. 422, 263 S.E.2d 228 (1979); Tusch
Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987); State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108
Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984);.
180. 711 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1985).
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characterized only as a breach of contract, and the plaintiff may
not recover damages under tort theories."" In Morrow v. L.A.
Goldschmidt Associates, Inc.1 82 the court affirmed the dismissal
of a homeowner's claim for punitive damages based on the defendant builder's "wilful and wanton misconduct."'1 8 3 Because
the builder's alleged negligence resulted only in the cost of repair, without personal injury or property damage, the court held
that there could be no liability in tort even if the breach of contract had been willful and wanton.'8
Although dicta in the case subsequently was overruled in
Sharp Brothers Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick
Co., 1 one of the most influential economic loss cases in the construction context is the 1978 Missouri Supreme Court decision
in Crowder v. Vandendeale.88 In Crowder the court denied a
subsequent homeowner's claim against the builder for the expenses of repairing the settlement cracks in the driveway, the
structure's brickwork, and the foundation slab. The issue was
"whether builders have a duty, enforceable by an action in tort,
to protect prospective purchasers from damage consisting of deterioration or 'loss of bargain.' "1187 The court concluded that no
duty should be created and drew a distinction between the
safety interests protected by tort law and the quality interests
protected by contract principles:
A duty to use ordinary care and skill is not imposed in the
abstract. It results from a conclusion that an interest entitled
to protection will be damaged if such care is not exercised.
Traditionally, interests which have been deemed entitled to
protection in negligence have been related to safety or freedom
from physical harm. Thus, where personal injury is threatened,
a duty in negligence has been readily found. Property interests

181. The court held that even an intentional or grossly negligent breach of contract
would not support an award of punitive damages absent a showing of a "distinct tortious
injury with actual damages." Id. at 618.
182. 112 I1. 2d 87, 492 N.E.2d 181 (1986).
183. Id. at 98, 492 N.E.2d at 186.
184. See id., 492 N.E.2d at 185.
185. 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986). Dicta in Crowder indicated that plaintiffs might
recover money for damages to the product itself. This was overruled in Sharp Brothers,
703 S.W.2d at 903.
186. 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978), overruled on other grounds, Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1936).
187. Id. at 880.
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also have generally been found to merit protection from physical harm. However, where mere deterioration or loss of bargain
is claimed, the concern is with a failure to meet some standard
of quality. This standard of quality must be defined
by refer188
ence to that which the parties have agreed upon.
The court recognized that a duty in tort to prevent economic
loss would be beneficial to certain classes of plaintiffs, such as
those whose contract claims are barred by the statute of limitation or those who have not entered into a contract with the
builder. The court, however, found the benefits of protecting
these classes outweighed by the builders' right to disclaim or
otherwise allocate the risk of economic harm through contract.'8 9
Another influential opinion came out of Illinois in
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf.90 The court applied products liability
principles to a subsequent homeowner's tort claim for latent
structural defects and assorted leaks. The court began by stating
that the measure of liability in tort is not determined by privity
or by foreseeability, but by the scope of the duty owed to the
plaintiff.19 ' Quoting dictum in Crowder that tort law seeks only
to protect safety interests, the court concluded that a complaint
alleging qualitative defects does not belong in tort:
To recover in negligence there must be a showing of harm
above and beyond disappointed expectations. A buyer's desire
to enjoy the benefit of his bargain is not an interest that tort
law traditionally protects ....
While the commercial expectations of this buyer have not been met by the builder, the only
danger to the plaintiff is that he [will] be forced to incur additional expenses .... 182
Redarowicz has been applied to both residential and commercial
construction disputes. 193

188. Id. at 882 (emphasis in original).
189. See id. at 883. Cf. R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818
(8th Cir. 1983) (involving a defective glass curtain wall on a commercial project); Nastri
v. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc., 142 Ariz. 439, 690 P.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1984) (similar facts);
But see Lempke v. Dagenais, 130 N.H. 782, 792-95, 547 A.2d 290, 296-98 (1988) (overruling Ellis v. Robert C. Morris, Inc., 128 N.H. 358, 513 A.2d, 951 (1986), a case that followed Crowder to hold that a defendant was not liable for economic loss).
190. 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
191. See id. at 176, 441 N.E.2d at 326.
192. Id. at 177, 441 N.E.2d 327.
193. See, e.g., Chicago Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel, Inc., 782 F.2d 723 (7th
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In Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Associates ArchitectsM the Minnesota Court of Appeals adopted the
sudden and dangerous formulation of the economic loss rule.
The plaintiff, a building owner, brought a suit in tort against a
brick manufacturer to recover the six million dollars he spent to
correct the deterioration in walls constructed with the defendant's brick. The court first rejected the plaintiff's claim that
damage to the mortar between the bricks qualified as damage to
"other property." The court reasoned that to use such relatively
minor damage as a condition to recovery in tort would thwart
the policies of the economic loss rule.'95 The court distinguished
damage resulting from deterioration, internal breakage, depreciation, and the failure of a product to meet contractual expectations from damage resulting from a hazardous condition or a
sudden and calamitous occurrence. 196
Other courts have commented on the amount of property
damage necessary to establish a tortious injury. The Fourth Circuit found damage to roofing felts caused by removal of defective shingles to be merely "incidental" to the economic losses.'
In State ex rel. Smith v. Tyonek Timber, Inc."" the Alaska Supreme Court held that a subcontractor had no."property interest" in the concrete slab he had made, despite the fact that the
cost of purchasing the defective concrete mix from the defendant had come out of the subcontractor's materials allowance. Interestingly, the court turned down the defendant's invitation to
apply the six-factor forseeability test formulated in a California
opinion, Biakanja v. Irving.9" The Tyonek court stated that the
first factor - the extent to which a transaction was intended to
benefit the plaintiff - would disqualify a remote party in any
event.200

Cir. 1986); Kiswaukee Community Health Servs. Center v. Hospital Bldg. & Equip. Co.,
638 F. Supp. 1492 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 115

Ill. 2d 146, 503 N.E.2d 246 (1986); Wheeling Trust & Say. Bank v. Tremco Corp., 153 Ill.
App. 3d 136, 505 N.E.2d 1045 (1987).
194. 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984).
195. See id. at 820 n.4.
196. See id. at 821.
197. See 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (4th Cir.
1986).
198. 680 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1984).
199. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16(1958). See also Tyonek Timber, 680 P.2d at 1152.

200. See 49 Cal. 2d at 647, 320 P.2d at 16.
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The New York Court of Appeals in Schiavone Construction
Co. v. Elgood Mayo Corp.20 1 adopted an intermediate economic
loss rule similar to that outlined in Minneapolis Society. The
court adopted Justice Silverman's dissent from the appellate decision below. Justice Silverman expressed the view that the economic ramifications of expanding tort recovery to include economic loss are so extensive and unforeseeable that expansion
properly should be effected by the legislature after investigation,
rather than by a court in the context of a particular case.20 2
In Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group 20 3 the
Washington Supreme Court refused to recognize a cause of action for negligent construction. The court expressed its sympathy for the plaintiff-homeowner's association, whose property
suffered from water rot due to defective woodwork. Even so, the
court found that a tort remedy would "unduly upset the law on
which expectations are built and business is conducted. ' 20 4 In
adopting the sudden and dangerous modification of the economic loss rule, the court particularly was concerned about the
possibility that certain buyers would reap a windfall by lowering
their purchase price to reflect deterioration and then suing the
builder for the cost of repair.20 5
The most complete treatment of the subject appears in the
South Carolina Court of Appeals' decision, Carolina Winds
Owners' Association v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc.2 0 6 In Carolina
Winds the court denied a condominium association recovery in
tort against the remote builder and his surety. The opinion
noted that economic interests traditionally have been protected
by the law of contract, rather than tort, because tort law seeks to
vindicate a person's interest in the security of his person and his
estate.20 7 Defective construction does not result from a builder's
failure to conform to a standard of care required by law but

201. 56 N.Y.2d 667, 436 N.E.2d 1322, 451 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1982).
202. Schiavone Construction, 81 A.D.2d 221, 229, 439 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 (1981)
(Silverman, J., dissenting).
203. 109 Wash. 2d 406, 745 P.2d 1284 (1987).
204. Id. at 418, 745 P.2d at 1290.
205. See id. at 421-22, 745 P.2d at 1292.
206. 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd on rehearing, No. 25 Davis
Adv. Sh. 21 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1988).
207. Id. at 82, 374 S.E.2d at 902.
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from a standard of quality imposed by contract. 0 8 The court expressly rejected the position taken by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v.
Whiting-Turner Contracting Co.,209 which held that economic
loss should be recoverable in tort for the creation of a lifethreatening risk.2 10 The Carolina Winds court found that the
Atlantis Condominium theory was unworkable in practice and
at variance with fundamental precepts of negligence theory. 1 1
IV.

CONCLUSION: A QUESTION OF QUALITY

Historically, it is clear that tort law never imposed a duty
on the part of construction contractors to protect owners from
economic losses arising from buildings that lose their value or
require repairs. As such, any decision to extend a tort duty to
construction contractors is an exercise in judicial policy-making
and should be made only after weighing all competing interests
and policies, as well as considering the practical impact upon litigation. Ultimately, the decision must serve the best interests of
society as a whole.21 2
The first interests to consider are those of the injured party.
In the context of construction defects, the injured party is the
owner of a defective building. The owner of a defective building
has a contract remedy against either the seller or, if the building
was constructed especially for the owner, against the contractor
or architect. In contracting for purchases, owners have an opportunity to bargain for some form of warranty or guarantee to protect against the possibility that the building will not fulfill their
expectations. As a practical matter, therefore, the economic loss
doctrine is an obstacle only to two classes of injured owners: (1)
those who failed to bargain for the contract right to be compensated for economic loss; and (2) those whose contract rights are
worthless because the seller is insolvent. Because no rule of law
can protect the second class while ignoring the first, the issue

208. Id. at 82-83, 374 S.E.2d at 902.
209. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986).
210. See id. at 35, 517 A.2d at 345.
211. See Carolina Winds, 297 S.C. at 86-88, 374 S.E.2d at 904-906 (1988).
212. See W. PROSSER, supra note 35, § 53, at 325-26 (characterizing duty as "the
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection").
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becomes one of providing recovery in tort to those who fail to

secure for themselves a remedy in contract.
The law of contract traditionally has permitted the builder
to define, and thus limit, his obligations to the owner through
agreement. The law of negligence creates an exception to this
right of contract in the case of injury to the owner or his property. The law gives to the owner the right to be free from physical harm and imposes upon the builder the duty to protect that
right. Naturally, a cost is associated with that duty: the expense
of construction methods designed to secure minimum safety
standards. Because the standard, protection against harm from
collapse or physical danger, is objective, the cost can be ascertained and internalized in the cost of construction. This results
in incrementally higher costs to the consuming public as a
whole, but society should be willing to impose the duty and pay
the cost because it has made a simple value choice; society values freedom from physical harm more than it values freedom of
contract.
Imposing a tort duty to construct a building that will not
cause economic harm to its owner - assuming such a duty is
capable of definition - will impose an incrementally larger cost
on society. This cost also will be internalized and spread among
the consumers of construction services. Eliminating economic
loss, therefore, is really a question of whether the consuming
public as a whole should bear the cost of economic losses sustained by those who failed to bargain for adequate contract remedies. The answer to this question is "no" for three reasons.
First, the owner can protect himself contractually; second, there
are several practical obstacles to shifting the risk of economic
losses; and third, judicial administration of a duty to prevent economic loss is difficult, if not impossible.
A.

The Myth of the Helpless Homeowner

Because so many of the reported construction defect cases
arise in the residential context, courts often have assumed a consumer protection orientation that indulges in unfounded assumptions about the need to protect innocent and helpless
homeowners from the depravities of monolithic contracting corporations. This is a serious mischaracterization of the
homebuilding industry, which is dominated by small, closely
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held corporations and family businesses investing large amounts
of borrowed capital in each project. More importantly, however,
it has obscured the fact that principles developed in the residential construction context will have equal application in the
highly sophisticated world of commercial and industrial
construction.213
The construction industry is not characterized by the unequal bargaining positions of a typical retail consumer and manufacturer. While an individual has no realistic chance of negotiating with soft drink or automobile manufacturers over the nature
of the products' design, manufacture, or warranty, such is not
the case in construction. In commercial construction, potential
owners have considerable control over the nature of the "product" they are buying. Owners, through their architects and the
process of establishing a construction budget, decide what is
built and how it will be built. It is completely unlike the "take it
or leave it" contract imposed by mass-marketers that prompted
the courts to open new avenues of relief for the consumer.
Similarly, the purchaser of a new or "used" building is in a
much better position to inspect for possible defects than the
buyer of a mass-produced consumer item. Many courts that permit recovery of economic loss for construction defects have
based their decision on the assumption that the average
21
homebuyer is not competent to inspect a house for defects. '

This assumption is questionable with regard to commercial con,struction, where owners and construction lenders routinely pay
architects or professional inspectors to monitor compliance with
design and code requirements. Similar options are available for
the homebuyer who has his house custom built. Even in the case

213. Judge Rovira, dissenting in Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041
(Colo. 1983), observed:
There is no principled way for this court - or any court - to limit the reasoning to the case of homebuilders; it can do so only by judicial fiat. While such
line-drawing is appropriate for a legislative body - indeed that is its primary
function - it is singularly inappropriate for a judicial body.

Id. at 1050.
214. See, e.g., Cosmopolitan Homes, 663 P.2d at 1045; Coburn v. Lenox Homes,
Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 575, 378 A.2d 599, 602-03 (1977); Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay
Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406 So. 2d 515, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Simmons
v. Owens, 363 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); McDonough v. Whalen, 365
Mass. 506, 512, 313 N.E.2d 435, 438-39 (1974); Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So.
2d 670, 671-72 (Miss. 1983).
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of used housing, the importance and enormous expense of the
purchase make it reasonable to expect the buyer to hire a professional house inspector. 15 In any event, the homeowner is in a
position to negotiate a warranty or reduction in purchase price
to reflect the risk of hidden defects. Unlike most consumer
goods, price and warranty are almost always negotiable in the
sale of realty. In recent years, the growth of commercial homeowner warranty programs has made protection available for latent defects at a relatively low price. Sympathy for a disappointed homeowner is just and natural, but it must be tempered
with a realistic appraisal of his bargaining power and the options
available to him. Moreover, sympathy cannot be allowed "to
lead to the creation of a logically inconsistent and vague theory
21 6
of recovery that fails to provide useful precedent.
B. Practical Obstacles to Loss Shifting
The basic function of tort law is to shift the burden of loss
from the injured plaintiff to one who is at fault (under negligence theory) or to one who is better able to bear the loss and
prevent its occurrence (under strict liability). In the mass production or distribution of products, the manufacturer is able to
absorb and spread the impact of its customers' losses through
insurance and incremental price increases. In the construction
context, however, there are two practical obstacles to this model
of loss-shifting.
The first obstacle is that as a practical matter, a construc-

215. The Ohio Supreme Court in Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d
594 (1966), stated:
[R]eal estate buyers generally experience little difficulty in securing express
warranties or guarantees if they are insistent .... [T]he purchase of real estate is invariably preceded by a lengthy period of inspection, consideration and
negotiation. One does not purchase land under conditions in any way similar to
the purchase of home permanents, cooking appliances, soap or electric
blankets.
Id. at 71-72, 218 N.E.2d at 598 (citations omitted). Accord Wright v. Creative Corp., 30
Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972). Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted in
Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974), that "a purchaser may insist
upon having included [in the contract of sale] any warranty or guaranty that he may
desire as to buildings standing upon it, and, of course, he may refuse to purchase if the
prospective vendor will not agree." Id. at 469.
216. See Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, 109 Wash. 2d 406, 407, 745
P.2d 1284, 1285 (1987).
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tion contractor cannot obtain liability insurance against the risk
of defects in his own work product.217 Such risks routinely are

excluded from the comprehensive general liability insurance policies written for construction companies. The contractor who
faces a claim for defective workmanship does so alone.
The second obstacle relates to the nature of the construction bidding process. Most projects undertaken by contractors
are unique, "one of a kind" buildings designed especially for a
particular owner and a particular purpose. In addition, much of
a contractor's work will be awarded through competitive bidding. Assuming that the law could devise a tort standard for the
prevention of economic loss that would enable the builder to ascertain what to do and how much it will cost, he still would be
required to make this calculation on a project-by-project basis,
taking into account the owners' and subsequent owners' specific
expectations. He then would have to factor those costs into his
bid.
In a business where bids often are calculated by simply estimating the actual cost of construction, adding fifteen percent for
profit and overhead and competing against other bids of unknown amount and composition, it is unrealistic to expect sophisticated risk evaluation and cost distribution to occur. For
this reason, contractors rely heavily on their contracts to allocate
and limit the risk of economic loss such as those caused by delays, defects, unforeseen conditions, and changes in design.
C. Difficulties of Judicial Administration of a Duty to
Prevent Economic Loss
By far the most compelling argument against recognition of
a tort duty to prevent economic harm is the difficulty in defining
and administering such a duty. The function of tort law is to
prescribe standards for the regulation of conduct. Therefore, the
law must offer a uniform standard of conduct to which the
builder can conform. This standard is relatively easy to define
217. See, e.g., Gary L. Shaw Builders, Inc. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Ga. App.
220, 355 S.E.2d 130 (1987); Sturla, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 67 Haw. 203, 684
P.2d 960 (1984); Indiana Ins. Co. v. DeZutti, 408 N.E.2d 1275 (Ind. 1980); Century I
Joint Venture v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 63 Md. App. 545, 493 A.2d 370
(1985); Lusalon, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 400 Mass. 767, 511 N.E.2d 595
(1987); Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233, 405 A.2d 788 (1979).
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when avoidance of physical danger to persons or their property
is concerned; a "reasonable builder" can be expected to know
which actions may result in collapse or danger of physical harm.
A standard that purports to guard against economic losses or
mere "defects" is another matter altogether. It seeks, in effect,
to legislate a minimum standard of quality by requiring the
builder to construct a building that will not need unreasonable
repairs. It is difficult to see how courts enforcing such a duty can
define and distinguish acceptable from unacceptable conduct in
construction of a building. It is easy to punish builders for creating condominiums with sagging floors; it is more difficult to define for them, in advance, the types of "defects" and the time
period in which they will be liable should those defects appear.
A closely related concern is that the builder does not solely
determine the quality of a building - that is, the extent to
which it will remain free of defects. In most projects, the quality
of a structure is determined primarily by the architect acting in
concert with the owner. Working within cost restrictions established by the owner, the architect specifies materials, fixtures,
electrical and mechanical systems, interior finishes, type and extent of structural bracing, and, often, particular construction
methods. Frequently, the contractor is required to downgrade
methods or materials in order to reduce a construction budget.
Unlike the manufacturer of a power saw or a soft drink, the construction contractor is not the "father of the transaction." Yet,
conventional tort law has no defense or rule that can aid the
contractor or subcontractor who did only what he was told indeed, what his contract obligated him to do.215
Moreover, all buildings are not created equal, nor are they
intended to be equal. The quality and durability of a structure
are a function of the design and the budget as much as the contractor's workmanship. These factors vary from one project to

218. The Florida Court of Appeals in Strathmore Riverside Villas Condominium
Ass'n v. Paver Dev. Corp., 369 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), relied on the same
reasoning to deny recovery against a remote contractor under an "implied warranty"
theory. The court, however, did not explain why the same reasoning would not apply
equally applicable to the use of tort theories against remote parties. See also Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1049-50 (Colo. 1983) (Rovira, J., dissenting)
(noting the "awkward position" of the contractor who complies with plans and specifications that create a condition desired by original owner but unacceptable to subsequent
owner).
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another. There is a world of difference between the reasonable
expectations of a purchaser of a new $1.5 million mansion and a
purchaser of a ten-year-old wooden bungalow built for temporary use. If the respective purchasers are to be permitted to sue
the builder in tort for conditions that require costly repairs, then
the courts must devise a uniform standard to determine which
conditions will be considered the result of unreasonably poor
work and which will be seen as the result of ordinary and expected deterioration. Presently, no such standard exists. Rusty
pipes in the mansion may be inexcusable and unacceptable, but
in the bungalow they may be par for the course. And what of a
purchaser who simply is unwilling to pay the extra cost to construct a plumbing system that would remain rust-free for ten
years?
This difficulty presents the potential for an unjustified
windfall to the subsequent owner, who may obtain a better bargain in tort from the contractor than the one he made in contract with the seller! The original owner may have gladly bargained for minimum standards in return for a low price, and the
subsequent owner may have negotiated a still lower price from
the original owner to reflect this fact. Having received his bargain, the subsequent owner should not be allowed to impose tort
liability on the builder for failing to build in accordance with
higher standards of care than the original owner paid for or required. A possible "windfall" is more problematic in the commercial context where the parties are presumably knowledgeable
and sophisticated enough to determine quality and risk, and
they adjust their bargain accordingly.
Foreseeability is not a practical mechanism for limiting or
defining a tort duty to prevent economic losses. Historically,
foreseeability was never intended or employed as the sole determinant of liability. Practically, it cannot serve that function.
Taken literally, it would turn every breach of contract into a
tort. Under what circumstances could a party breaching a contract not foresee that economic harm will result to the other
party? Similarly, in the context of construction defects, virtually
all economic harm would be foreseeable since every builder
knows that repairs will be necessary if he performs his work in a
"negligent" manner. With respect to the foreseeability of the
class of persons affected, the concept is even less useful. For example, even among courts that have recognized a tort duty to
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protect against economic loss, there is no agreement as to
whether it is "foreseeable" that a structure will change ownership in the near future.2 19
The proponents of foreseeability may have taken to heart
Judge Cardozo's lesson on privity in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,220 but they have missed his lesson in Ultramares v.
Touche, Niven & Co.22 1 Foreseeability does not solve the problem of potential unlimited liability out of proportion with the
fault. It certainly is foreseeable to the builders of bridges or
shopping centers that shutting down the bridge or mall to repair
defects will cause business interruption and lost profits to hundreds of businesses dependent on those structures for their livelihood. If such risks are to be imposed on the builder, it is not
difficult to imagine what will happen to the cost of building
bridges.
This problem might be solved by a judicial fiat, such as by
limiting recovery of economic losses to those with a fee interest
in the building. Courts certainly have engaged in such line-drawing before.22 2 Such a solution is hardly less arbitrary, however,
than the distinctions drawn by a bright-line economic loss rule.
The practical problems inherent in creating a tort action for economic losses223 are not remedied by the adoption of the sudden

219. See, e.g., Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 573, 378 A.2d 599, 602
(because house is "generally a long-term investment," which does not "generally change
owners or occupants frequently," builder "may not have reasonably been expected to
anticipate a change in ownership"). But see Cosmopolitan Homes, 663 P.2d at 1045
("Given the mobility of most potential home owners, it is foreseeable that a house will be
sold to subsequent purchasers.").
220.,217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
221. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
222. For example, in Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866), the New
York Court of Appeals adopted a rule that a railroad that negligently starts a fire is
liable in damages to the owner of property immediately adjoining the tracks but not to
properties damaged as the fire spreads outward to land beyond the adjoining properties.
The court's rationale simply was that the loss was an uninsurable, and potentially ruinous, risk for the railroad.
223. The present state of the economic loss doctrine in California is eloquent testimony to the difficulties in administering a tort duty to prevent economic loss. Having
ruled in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965),
that economic loss is not recoverable in strict liability or negligence for product defects,
the courts promptly allowed the recovery of economic loss for a poorly graded lot in
strict liability in Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1969) and Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749
(1969). Meanwhile, California courts have issued conflicting opinions on the question of

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

49

South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2020], Art.
5
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol.

40

and dangerous test or by the adoption of a six-factor foreseeability test.
To their credit, the above tests do attempt to identify the
relevant policy considerations at stake in a case when the plaintiff seeks to recover for damages to the work product alone. It is
debatable, however, whether these two modes of analysis provide the courts with a tool to resolve upcoming cases or, instead,
with another dilemma. Like many judicially crafted "tests" that
attempt to convert abstract policy concerns into a step-by-step
guide to decisionmaking, the sudden and dangerous test and the
six-part foreseeability analysis are sufficiently pliable to enable a
judge or jury to fashion any result they may desire.
Such an analysis also is of little use as a guide to govern
future conduct. The goal of tort law is not only to compensate
the victim for his injury, but also to deter future injury by establishing standards of conduct. If those standards can only be understood in hindsight of a jury, then the function of deterrence
is lost. Additionally, the sudden and dangerous test approach
adds no deterrent value to the traditional tort standard. Under
the traditional negligence standard, the builder is subjected to
liability if he creates a condition that causes physical harm to
others. Builders will take no different or additional precautions
if told that they will be liable for creating a condition that might
cause physical harm to others.
A bright-line test, which denies recovery across the board
when the damage sustained is solely economic, produces results
that are predictable to contracting parties and are relatively
simple to employ in judicial decisionmaking. Predictability and
consistency of result are not the only virtues to expect in a rule
of law, but they are necessary virtues. These elements are required to permit persons to govern their conduct and structure
their commercial transactions, and they are necessary to ensure
that adjudication is conducted in a fair and even-handed
recovering economic loss under a negligence theory. See Sacramento Regional Transit
Dist. v. Grumman Flxible, 158 Cal. App. 3d 289, 204 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1984); Huang v.

Garner, 157 Cal. App. 3d 404, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984)) J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.
App. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979) (allowed recovery in negligence but

not in strict liability).
A federal district court reviewing the above opinions described the progression of
California case law as "inexplicable." See Golden Eagle Distr. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,
103 F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
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manner.
Perhaps more than any other industry, the construction industry is "vitally enmeshed in our economy and dependent on
settled expectations."224 The parties involved in a construction
project rely on intricate, highly sophisticated contracts to define
the relative rights and responsibilities of the many persons
whose efforts are required - owner, architect, engineer, general
contractor, subcontractor, materials supplier - and to allocate
among them the risk of problems, delays, extra costs, unforeseen
site conditions, and defects.22 5 Imposition of tort duties that cut
across those contractual lines disrupts and frustrates the parties'
contractual allocation of risk and permits the circumvention of a
carefully negotiated contractual balance among owner, builder,
and design professional. Indeed, the "right of the parties to
make their own bargain as to economic risk" is impaired. 26
Other avenues of relief, which do not carry the burdens and
social cost of recovery ih tort, are available to the owner. If the
owner failed to negotiate an adequate contractual remedy in his
purchase agreement, he can seek an assignment of the seller's
contract rights against the builder. Such an assignment would
permit the owner to shift the loss back to the builder without
depriving the builder of the right to define his obligations
through the contracting process. If additional protection is
needed, then the legislature could impose a bonding requirement
on developers of residential housing to secure performance of repair work.
Contractors, owners, and design professionals are better
suited to allocate economic risks among themselves, rather than
to have such risks allocated for them by a rule of law that draws
no distinctions between the risks generated by a defective carpet
and those generated by a defective twenty-story office building.
The economic loss doctrine best protects the parties' right to

224. Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc., 109 Wash. 2d 406, 421, 745
P.2d 1284, 1292 (1987).
225. See Bernard Johnson, Inc. v. Continental Constructors, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 365,
371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 233 Va. 31, 35, 353 S.E.2d 724, 727
(1987) ("The parties involved in a construction project resort to contracts and contract
law to protect their economic expectations.").
226. Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. 1978) (emphasis in original), overruled on other grounds, Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986).
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make that allocation of risk by contract.
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